Why Iraq is not Vietnam
While I agree that Iraq and Vietnam were both strategically foolish things for the United States to involve itself in, I think that the comparisons between the two are somewhat overstated.
First of all, Vietnam was tactically mismanaged, as well as being a strategic blunder. General Westmoreland was too set in his convictions that infantry should find the enemy, engage him, achieve victory, and return with honor. In fighting a counter-insurgency, tactical logic dictates that you go defeat the enemy and hold on to territory, not get in your choppers and go home, only to retake the same hill the next day. Iraq, on the other hand, has been managed quite well tactically, with the small exception of heavily armed units running too far ahead of their supply units. There wasn't the problem of the corridor collapsing (see: Wehrmacht, Barbarossa) but rather, enemy forces would hunker down and wait for the less-able-to-defend-themselves supply units came up a few hours later. So, difference one: tactical management.
Second, and more importantly, we had and have much clearer goals in Iraq than in Vietnam. The Bush administration's reasons for going to war have changed, (this is a debate that isn't worth getting into right now) but our strategic goals were clear: go in, remove Saddam from power (+10 bonus points for his capture,) set up a democratic government. In Vietnam we were ostensibly trying to contain communism, through showing our commitment to our SEATO obligations (as New Yorker columnist Wm. Whitworth put it: "we have the blance of power in order to deal with the problem, and we have to deal with the problem in order to preserve the balance") thereby deterring any future aggression. The problems were that we weren't sure who we were deterring (Hanoi, Peking (Beijing), Moscow) and most importantly, we weren't sure what the best way to do that was. We failed to appreciate von Clauswitz's addage that "war is an extension of politics by other means." As John Lewis Gaddis points out, process overtook goals, means became ends in themselves, and all meaningful strategy ceased to exist.
We haven't yet made these strategic mistakes in Iraq. While our exit strategy seems to be lacking (like in Bosnia in '95,) we haven't yet lost sight of our goals and what we want to accomplish. As much as these ends may not justify their means, at least we've got our eyes on the prize.
To finish this off, let me say that I believe we need to leave Iraq as soon as our goals are achieved. Once a government is in place, and the new Iraqi state has the means to enforce its sovereignty, we should get out of town. We must not simply sit on Iraq as we have sat on Germany and Japan since 1945. We can't do this yet. That would be like coming into someone's home to redo his kitchen, tearing out the appliances and the drywall, and then deciding the job was harder than it looked at first, and leaving. However, once the infrastructure: government and instruments of sovereignty, are in place, we must leave, even if the situation in Iraq isn't as calm and peaceful as some isolated town in the Catskills. We must do this, without regard to any notions of "international credibility and respect." As the great soon-to-be-centenarian George F. Kennan said in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966:
"[T]here is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant and unpromising objectives."Iraq isn't Vietnam, not by damn sight. But that doesn't mean that we won't lose our focus, and head down the slippery slope.
Note:
With regard to facts, I relied a great deal on the book chapter that got me thinking about this: Chapter 8 in: John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.)
